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Ganging Up Against the Courts: Congressional
Curtailment of Judicial Review, 1988-2004
Benjamin Keele, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Congress has sought to exercise this power throughout
its history, especially when the courts have issued a decision or series of
decisions that are very unpopular. The precise nature of Congress'
authority in this area is controversial and scholars have proposed many
criteria and theories to delineate the legislative and judicial branches'
respective powers. This study, examining the number of times Congress has
categorically denied the courts' jurisdiction over a defined set of cases
between 1988 and 2004, finds that Congress has denied jurisdiction 166
times. This practice, while currently relatively narrow, could have major
implications for the balance of powers between the three branches of the
federal government and the vindication of individual rights if allowed to
become more prevalent.

The United States Constitution (art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 2) provides that:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
Under this authority, Congress has denied the courts the power to
hear certain kinds of cases. When the courts have issued
controversial decisions, legislators often propose preventing the
courts from continuing to make unpopular decisions by denying
them jurisdiction over those cases. The scope of Congress' authority
to curtail judicial review is subject to scholarly and political
disagreement.
I will examine the history of the executive and legislative
branches' efforts to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal judicial
branch. I will also review the scholarly debate over the power of
Congress to curtail review over cases involving constitutional rights.
However, little has been written on Congress' restricting review of
cases concerning statutory law. Then, I will study how often and in
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what ways Congress has denied judicial review from 1988 to 2005.
Finally, I will discuss how Congress' empirical practices toward
judicial review have implications for separation of powers, open
governance and individual rights.
Historical Attempts to Deny Jurisdiction

In the past, lawmakers have attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts as a response to unpopular decisions. After decrying the
unpopular decisions, legislators have tended to declare the judiciary
an undemocratic institution that must be brought to heel by the
majoritarian legislative branch.
The concept of judicial review was first introduced to federal
constitutional jurisprudence in Marbuy v. Madison (1803). Marbuy
established that the courts, as interpreters of the laws and the
Constitution, had the power to invalidate laws and actions that were
inconsistent with the Constitution. This power has made the courts a
major influence in the political process of enacting legislation. Many
laws that passed muster in the more political, majoritarian
institutions have been struck down by the courts. There is
considerable debate concerning the proper role of the courts in
America's political system and how much deference legislatively
approved measures deserve from the courts. I will not attempt to
address that issue directly, but I will briefly review how Congress
has tried to reduce judicial review in order to increase its relative
power and implement its policy preferences.
Using the authority articulated in Marbury, the Court began
invalidating state laws in the first decades of the 1800s.
Unsurprisingly, these decisions were not popular with state officials
and their representatives in Congress.
The first congressional attempts to repeal Supreme Court
jurisdiction were occasioned by the Court's early decisions
overturning state laws. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 authorized the Supreme Court to review, and
therefore declare invalid, decisions of the states' highest
courts that upheld state laws challenged as conflicting with
the federal Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties. With
each successive ruling striking down a state law,
opposition to Section 25 grew among proponents of states'
rights (Biskupic and Witt 1997, 337).
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Proposals were introduced to repeal Section 25 and thus deprive the
Court of hearing any state court decisions upholding a state law
challenged on federal grounds. While the proposals were never even
passed by a single house of Congress, the justices and supporters of
the Court were deeply concerned by the move (Biskupic and Witt
1997, 337-38). The Court later declined an opportunity to expand its
jurisdiction over state court decisions, portending the future
influence that attempted jurisdictional restrictions, even failed ones,
could have on courts' decision-making.
While the first attempt to restrict the judiciary's jurisdiction was
unsuccessful, the second major attempt utterly succeeded, stopping
the Supreme Court from deciding a case over which it was
deliberating. After defeating the Confederacy in the Civil War,
Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, placing the
southern states under military rule until they met certain conditions,
one of which was ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure
equal protection of the laws for the recently emancipated slaves.
Congress had also recently granted the Court jurisdiction over
habeas corpus appeals. "Seeking to protect blacks and federal
officials in the South from harassment by white southerners,
Congress in February 1867 enacted a statute expanding the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to review denials of writs of habeas corpus"
(Biskupic and Witt 1997, 338). A case would soon arise that would
make Congress reconsider the wisdom of its decision.
William H. McCardle was the editor of a Mississippi newspaper.
Displeased with the military government, he frequently attacked the
generals and called for whites to resist reforms to grant blacks
political influence. Major General Edward O.C. Ord, the commander
of the military district in which McCardle published, finally tired of
McCardle's complaints and charged him with several offenses,
including inciting insurrection and libel. Ord charged McCardle in a
military court. McCardle argued that trying him before a military
court was unconstitutional and filed a petition for habeas corpus. The
trial court denied habeas corpus and McCardle used the 1867 statute
to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Court heard arguments in the case and, given the Court's
disapproval of trying civilians in military courts while civilian courts
were available (Ex Parte Miligan 1866), Republicans rightly feared
that McCardle's incarceration (and the Reconstruction Acts that
authorized it) would be invalidated. They managed to insert an
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amendment to withdraw the Court's jurisdiction over writs of habeas
corpus and any such cases before it. The bill was enacted over the
veto of President Andrew Johnson. The Court then duly dismissed
McCardle's case before it was able to rule on the merits. "Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase wrote that the Constitution gave Congress
the authority to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction
and that Congress had expressly exercised that authority" (Biskupic
and Witt 1997, 339). Thus, Congress was able to preserve the
Reconstruction Acts.
The circumstances of this successful denial of jurisdiction show
some of the ingredients of such restrictions: cases preceding the
denial were sufficiently unpopular to garner great support for
denying jurisdiction, the denial would permit the execution of policy
that Congress preferred, and supporters of the courts did not
persuasively advocate for maintaining a relatively strong judiciary.
These ingredients will help show why some congressional denials of
jurisdiction pass, while the vast majority of those proposed do not.
Lawmakers have habitually introduced bills to curb the courts'
jurisdiction.
The congressional weapon that is probably most often
raised against the federal judiciary is that of curtailing its
jurisdiction. Countless efforts of this kind have been
recorded; casual perusal of Charles Warren's Supreme
Court history for the nineteenth century alone discloses
their occurrence in 1808, 1821, 1822, 1824, 1825, 1826,
1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1846, 1858, 1867, 1868, 1871,
1872, and 1882. Almost every occasion is clearly traceable
to momentous constitutional rulings, most of them
declarations of unconstitutionality (Choper 1980, 145).
The judiciary's jurisdiction has not been free from attack in the
twentieth century either. The Portal-to-Portal Act eliminated the
jurisdiction of the state and federal courts over rights to portal-toportal pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Bills to limit
judicial review were proposed in 1957 and 1958. It had only been a
few years since Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), and
the Court had also issued several decisions relating to national
security that fmstrated legislators' quest to root out Communists
from positions of influence. The Court, then, was not very popular
with some lawmakers. On July 26, 1957, Senator William E. Jenner
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of Indiana introduced a bill to deny jurisdiction over the following
areas: admissions to practice law in state courts, proceedings before
and functions of congressional committees, employee loyaltysecurity programs, and state regulations against subversive activities
and school board rules relating to subversive activities among
teachers (Pritchett 1961, 31). Each of these denials related to a
decision by the Court of which Jenner disapproved.
Unlike the circumstances in the McCardle denial, opponents to
Jenner's bill were able to take action to interrupt its progress.
"Because of the widespread opposition which had been expressed
against the device of limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, four
of the subjects which the original Jenner bill had forbidden the Court
to touch were dropped" (Pritchett 1961, 32). Instead of denying
jurisdiction to the Court, the bill was amended to reverse the
controversial decisions by amending the statutes the Court had been
interpreting. The jurisdictional denial relating to state bar admissions
rules was left intact. However, what remained in the bill was
ultimately moot because it was defeated in the Senate.
Several factors contributed to the failure of the Jenner bill. First,
Pritchett suggests that respect for the Supreme Court as an institution
was a primary factor. "Basically, the Court was protected by the
respect which is so widely felt for the judicial institution in the
United States.. .a great part of opinion in the United States holds that
the Supreme Court should be let alone, or rather that it should be
subject to influence only in the accepted manner, namely, by use of
the appointing power when vacancies occur" (Pritchett 1961, 119).
Pritchett wrote this in 1961, but respect for the Supreme Court has
remained relatively high, even though recent controversies have
somewhat tarnished its public image. "Currently, 57% of Americans
have a favorable impression of the Supreme Court, with 30%
expressing an unfavorable view. In the past, favorable views of the
court surpassed 70%" (Pew Research Center 2005). Even though the
Pew study indicated that the Court's reputation had fallen due to
partisan fighting over nominations to the Court, over half of
Americans polled still thought highly of the Court. This respect has
been integral to warding off most proposals to strip the courts of
jurisdiction over entire swaths of legal territory. However, as I will
later show, it has hardly immunized the courts from smaller, less
visible, piecemeal curtailment.
Pritchett also mentions as reasons the bill failed the motives of
the proponents of jurisdiction-stripping and the timbre of their
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rhetoric. While northern Democrats voted to preserve the Court's
jurisdiction, southern Democrats voted for Jenner's bill to limit the
Court that had mandated desegregation. "It is paradoxical but
probably true that the segregation issue increased the bitterness of
the legislative drive against the Court and at the same time
guaranteed the defeat of the attack" (Pritchett 1961, 120). Some
lawmakers also exaggerated the negative effect the Court's rulings
would have on national security. This hyperbole decreased the
credibility of advocates for denial of jurisdiction.
Another possible variable in the conflict between the Court and
Congress was the Court's own behavior following the introduction of
the jurisdiction-limiting bills. Terri Jennings Peretti argues that the
threat posed by the Jenner bill influenced the Court's jurisprudence.
Although the Jenner Bill restricting the Court's jurisdiction
was defeated in the Senate (by only a 41 to 49 vote), the
fierce congressional reaction appears to have had its
desired effect. In 1959, the Court upheld HUAC authority
in Barenblatt v. U.S. and state authority to investigate
subversive activities in Uphaus v. Wyman. What Walter
Murphy terms a "tactical withdrawal" is further
substantiated by a 20 percent increase in the rate at which
the Court rejected civil liberties claims from the 1956 to
1958 term (Peretti 1999, 140).
However, Pritchett argues that the Jenner bill had no effect on the
Court's later decisions. "The danger of retaliatory legislation had
largely passed by the time the Court handed down Barenblatt,
Uphaus, and the other conciliatory decisions. The Court did not
'save' itself by these decisions. It had already been saved because a
majority in the two houses of Congress was not disposed. ..to use
legislative power to override judicial determinations" (Pritchett
1961, 121). Even if the rulings that were issued immediately after the
threat had passed were not influenced in any way, it is entirely
possible that the justices wished to avoid such threats in the future by
writing less controversial decisions and letting Congress' anger
subside.
Near the end of his book, Pritchett declares that "[ilt seems quite
possible that the Supreme Court's victory in this controversy has had
the effect of permanently neutralizing what is perhaps the most
drastic congressional authority over the Court, the control of its
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appellate jurisdiction" (Pritchett 1961, 121-22). Later events would
render his conclusion premature, if not incorrect. Controversial,
high-profile decisions have stimulated calls for jurisdictional
restrictions for the past thirty years.
Burger Court rulings on abortion and school busing prompted a
wave of jurisdiction-stripping bills in the 1970s. An amendment
proposed by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina in 1979 would
have deprived courts of jurisdiction over voluntary school prayer. In
the 1980s bills were introduced to remove jurisdiction over abortion,
school prayer and male-only military draft cases. Like their
predecessors in the late 1950s, none of these bills was enacted into
law. Nonetheless, jurisdiction-stripping remains a viable
congressional tool to this day, albeit often in a less conspicuous
form.
Within the past few years, several court decisions have again
prompted calls to restrict the judiciary's jurisdiction. In 2002, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
requiring the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public school
classrooms violated the First Amendment because the words "under
God" constituted an establishment of religion (Newdow v. US.
Congress 2002). The highest courts of Vermont and Massachusetts
have mandated same-sex civil unions or marriage, respectively. This
led some legislators to fear that a federal court would eventually
invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act, a law that allows states to
refuse to recognize marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in
other states. Legislators have responded by introducing provisions to
remove the courts' jurisdiction over the Defense of Marriage Act and
the Pledge of Allegiance.
The House Judiciary Committee's report on the Marriage
Protection Act argued that "Congress must exercise its constitutional
authority to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to ensure that
the states, and not unelected Federal judges, have the final say on
whether they must accept same-sex marriage licenses issued in other
states" (U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary 2004, 4). This
invocation of congressional power to limit jurisdiction demonstrates
that this tool is far from neutralized. In 2004, the House passed the
Marriage Protection Act and the Pledge Protection Act (Bazon,
Killian and Thomas 2005, 10). At present, none of these high-profile
proposals have been passed by the Senate. However, since at least
1988 (and probably much before then), Congress has been exercising
its power over the courts' jurisdiction to insulate less well-publicized

Ganging Up Against the Courts
decisions and rules from judicial review.
The Scope of Congress' Power to Regulate Jurisdiction
Along with efforts in Congress to limit jurisdiction have come reams
of scholarly writings arguing over the exact scope of Congress's
authority. The literature is voluminous to the point of unwieldiness.
"[Olne might expect that the ultimate tribunal -- that of academics
(who, unlike the Justices, often claim infallibility even though they
lack finality) -- would have reached a consensus after more than a
century and a half of scrutiny. But I can assure you that there is no
such consensus" (Gunther 1984, 897). Commenting on why limiting
the jurisdiction of the courts is so controversial, Mark Tushnet and
Jennifer Jaff (1984, 1328) write, "we suggest that those concerns
[over judicial jurisdiction] arise from disquiet over the fundamental
structure of the Constitution.. .the practices of politics and judging no
longer meet the demands of a sound constitutional order." They
hypothesize that most citizens no longer have confidence that the
Constitution itself will limit the courts' discretion to decree policy by
judicial fiat. Thus, the power of the judiciary is increased (at least
perceptually) and the boundaries of the courts' power become more
politically important.
Whatever the cause of the topic's popularity, a proper treatment
of all the disparate theories regarding Congress' power to curtail the
courts' jurisdiction would overwhelm the other parts of this study. In
addition, most of the debate concerns Congress' power to deny a
judicial forum for constitutional rights. Most commentators seem to
take for granted that Congress may alter the courts' jurisdiction over
statutory issues at will. Perhaps that alone helps explain why
Congress frequently deprives the courts of jurisdiction over statutory
issues and, despite an impressive amount of discussion, fails to enact
legislation that pertains to higher-profile constitutional issues.
Therefore, I will attempt to provide only a brief review of some of
the most salient theories on restricting judicial review. This should
supply adequate theoretical context to the historical and empirical
evidence of Congress' practices in this area.
Broadly speaking, the plethora of views on Congress' power
over the courts' jurisdiction can be arrayed on a spectrum. One end
represents the view that Congress is plenipotentiary with respect to
the courts and can grant or withhold jurisdiction at its discretion. On
the other end is the opinion that the Constitution requires Congress to
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grant jurisdiction to the courts and that jurisdiction itself is
constitutionally protected from diminution. In the middle, then, is a
large variety of permutations of these two extremes. Some types of
jurisdiction can be limited by Congress while others cannot; under
certain conditions Congress can limit the courts' jurisdiction, as long
as some tribunal (state, specially established, or otherwise) is
available, jurisdiction can be denied to all others. A few
representative examples will suffice to illustrate this spectrum.
The first theory is what Edward Keynes and Randall K. Miller
(1989) term the plenary view. Under this view, the language in
Article I11 mentioning exceptions and regulations to the courts'
jurisdiction authorizes Congress to confer as much or as little
jurisdiction as it sees fit. "Unless Congress enacts jurisdictional
legislation, the Supreme Court cannot exercise its appellate
jurisdiction. Once Congress has acted, as John Marshall observed,
the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction that Congress has not
specifically conferred" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 4). Under this
theory, the courts are wholly at the mercy of Congress.
The plenary view may seem to grant Congress an immense
advantage over the judiciary. "Congress could use its authority to
emasculate the federal courts' power of judicial review. By
eradicating federal jurisdiction over constitutional rights, Congress
could upset the delicate balance of power between the legislative and
judicial branches" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 7). While there is
certainly a risk that Congress could simply choose to deprive the
courts of all jurisdiction except that which is specifically provided in
the Constitution, it seems quite unlikely. First, while Congress has
historically proposed many bills to limit the courts' jurisdiction, the
vast majority have never been enacted into law. Second, in order for
such an extreme move to be politically palatable, the courts would
have to become so unpopular that a sizable majority of the public
would support eliminating wide swaths of the courts' jurisdiction.
Given that a 57% approval rating is considered unusually low for the
Supreme Court, the courts would have to become incompetent or
issue such unpopular decisions that most government agencies and
citizens openly defy them to be seriously threatened by such
sweeping proposals. Finally, "since the political branches realize that
the use of federal courts is essential to administer federal law-for
the purposes of both imposing government coercion and enforcing
private remedies-Congress cannot, as a practical matter, withdraw
all federal jurisdiction, even if it were authorized to do so
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constitutionally" (Choper 1980, 54). Government simply cannot
function without the courts. It would be far more trouble for
Congress to strip the courts of jurisdiction and erect new
enforcement mechanisms for its laws than to reverse undesirable
court decisions through statutory amendment and the influencing of
judicial appointments.
Further undermining the plenary view is the understanding of
judicial review articulated in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No.
78, Alexander Hamilton argues that the judiciary must be able to
invalidate laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution. "If it be
said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this
cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected
from any particular provisions in the Constitution" (Hamilton 1788).
If Congress were able to prevent the courts from fulfilling this
function by eliminating judicial review, it would be able to violate
the Constitution without restraint.
While proponents of the plenary view emphasize the regulations
and exceptions clause, supporters of the mandatory view focus on the
vesting clause: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Under this
language, there must be a Supreme Court with the government's
judicial power. "The only authority over the federal judiciary given
to Congress in the original plan of article I11 was the discretion to
establish and structure inferior courts, to distribute and allocate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts among the Supreme Court and the
inferior federal courts, and to make regulations of practice and
procedure for these courts" (Clinton 1986, 1518). Proponents of this
constitutional interpretation hold that the courts serve a fundamental
place in the government; therefore, one branch cannot reduce another
branch to insignificance. "Admittedly, the exceptions and regulations
clause confers some power on Congress, but it does not permit the
legislature to destroy the basic structure of government or vitiate the
Framers' remedial purpose" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 8). On the
other hand, without some check on the judiciary's power, there is the
danger of what some scholars and commentators call the "imperial
judiciary," a judiciary that supplants the legislative and executive
functions of government and brazenly implements its own policy
preferences.
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This risk, like the risks under the plenary view, is fairly low.
First, courts are staffed by judges selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. This must have a crucial influence on the
jurisprudence of the courts. Peretti (1999, 130) notes that "most
justices, most of the time, satisfy the ideological and policy
expectations of their appointing presidents. This is to be expected
given the great care with which most presidents evaluate the
ideological credentials of their Supreme Court nominees." Courts
can thus be checked by selecting jurists who will not regard their role
as that of an official who is empowered to unilaterally change the
law without reasonable legal grounds. Second, Congress can amend
laws to nullify undesirable decisions. This was the option that
lawmakers preferred when they were considering how to respond to
the Court's national security decisions in the late 1950s.
Undoubtedly Congress has the authority to amend statutes to help
clarify their interpretation. This check is not as readily available in
cases of constitutional interpretation due to the formidable majorities
that must be assembled to ensure passage through Congress and
ratification by the states of constitutional amendments. Whether by
appointments or overruling interpretations, Congress has means at its
disposal to check the judiciary without limiting its jurisdiction.
The middle ground between these two poles, generally speaking,
is the view that Congress can restrict the courts' jurisdiction, but
only with limits on that power. A number of limits have been
proposed throughout the literature. One limitation proposed by
scholars is that Congress cannot limit the jurisdiction of the courts
such that the essential functions of the courts cannot be executed. "If
the Court was intended the curb Congressional excesses in
appropriately presented 'cases or controversies,' and if an attempt to
exercise that power might in turn be blocked by Congress as a
judicial 'excess,' then the Convention was aimlessly going in
circles" (Berger 1969, 286). Congress cannot check the courts in
such a way that the courts cannot check Congress.
Since the actual text of the Constitution does not mention any
limits on Congress' power to alter the judiciary's jurisdiction,
producing a list of the essential functions of the courts is an exercise
in discerning what role the courts uniquely fill in government.
Keynes and Miller (1989, 16) suggest that "[iln a constitutional
democracy, the courts must have judicial power to protect the rule of
law, fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, and the rights
of insular minorities." Courts are also supposed "to promote
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uniformity of decision, to assure national supremacy, to implement
national law, to provide a neutral forum for out-of-state and foreign
suitors, and to preserve the citizens' constitutional rights against
popular oppression" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 17). Any
congressional restrictions on the courts' jurisdiction that prevent
them from fulfilling these essential functions are unconstitutional,
according to this view.
The primary difficulty with this view is arguing that Congress'
power to limit the courts' jurisdiction ends where the courts'
essential functions begin is only another way of saying that
Congress' powers end where the courts' powers begin. The branches
of government disagree on which checks and balances apply to them
and what powers are allocated to each of them. This is made clear by
the argument of advocates for jurisdictional limitation that when the
courts begin "legislating from the bench," they are usurping the
essential functions of the legislative branch and Congress must check
the courts to restore the proper balance of power.
In many cases, the Supreme Court and other federal
judicial bodies not only have exceeded their constitutional
limits, but have challenged the principle of federalism that
should protect the balance of power between the national
government and the governments of the states.. ..America's
Founding Fathers created a democratic republic in which
elected representatives were to decide the important issues
of the day. In their view, the role of the judiciary, although
crucial, was to interpret and clarify the law-not to make
law (Meese 1998,782-83).
So if the three branches of government could simply agree upon their
proper respective roles, they would not overstep their bounds and
there would be no need for the branches to check each other,
eliminating the need for congressional restrictions on the courts'
jurisdiction. Since none of the branches can agree, they must check
each other. However, since they do not agree on their proper powers
or essential functions, one branch that is being limited by another
claims that the limitation itself is improper and is upsetting the
proper balance of power. The essential hnctions theory merely
redefines the debate over the separation of powers that has existed
since before the Constitution was ratified.
While this review of the debate over Congress' authority to limit
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the judiciary's jurisdiction is necessarily cursory, it provides a
backdrop for examining what Congress has actually done to limit the
courts' jurisdiction in recent years, a topic that has not been
investigated extensively in the literature. I will now move fiom
theoretical review to empirical observations on Congress' behavior
toward the courts.

The Empirical Study
I studied the frequency and nature of congressional denials of
jurisdiction from 1988 to 2004 to gain understanding of how the use
of this authority affected the relationships between the three branches
of the federal government. I conducted text searches on LexisNexis
of public laws enacted between 1988 and 2004. This period was
selected because it contained the earliest laws (the earliest is P.L.
100-243, enacted February 9, 1988) in LexisNexis at the time and
went through the 1 0 8 Congress.
~~
I conducted two searches for each Congress. First, I searched for
"judicial review." This is the most commonly used phrase to indicate
review of laws and executive actions by the courts. I accessed each
public law that appeared in the search results and then used the web
browser's "Find in This Page" function to find "judicial review." An
example of the phrase in statutory language might read: "There shall
be no judicial review of any determination under this section by the
Secretary." I read the text surrounding each occurrence of "judicial
review" and determined whether the provision was an express denial
of jurisdiction over a defined set of cases or a defined set of laws,
rules, actions or decisions by any government agent. If I determined
the provision was an express denial of jurisdiction, I recorded the
public law number, Statutes At Large citation, the number of the
section containing the provision, and the set of cases, rules or actions
over which jurisdiction was denied in an appendix that is on file with
the journal and author.
Second, I conducted a broader search in case jurisdiction was
denied but the language did not contain the phrase "judicial review."
I searched for "court*." This search yielded any law that contained
the word "court" and any letters thereafter (e.g., "courts,"
"courthouse," "courtroom"). I then searched within these results for

'

'1f you have questions or would like to examine this appendix, please contact
the author at benjamin.j.keele@grnail.comor the journal at psajournal@union.edu.
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the word "review." So, while the language "No court shall have
jurisdiction to review any determination under this section by the
Secretary," would not have been found in the first search, it would be
found in the second search, thus providing a more complete count of
provisions relating to judicial review. I repeated the "Find in This
Page" procedure for any public laws I had not already searched.
For the purposes of this study, an express denial of jurisdiction
is a provision of a public law that categorically and explicitly
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to review or hear a defined class of
cases, set of governmental actions, set of rules and regulations or set
of statutory provisions, or that repeals a previously effective
authorization of judicial review. It will be helpful to illustrate this
definition with some examples that do not meet it.
Public Law 102-385, the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, provides that any judicial review
under the Act will be heard by a three-judge district court and any
appeals from the district court shall go directly to the Supreme Court.
This law, and many others like it, simply regulates the manner and
forum in which judicial review may be had. Since jurisdiction is not
completely denied but merely directed to specific places or in
specific ways, such provisions are not congressional denials of
jurisdiction for the purposes of this study. Also, many laws provide
time limits for filing an action after which no court will have
jurisdiction over the action. Again, these provisions are purely
procedural in nature and are not the topic of this study.
Section 410 of Public Law 104-1, the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995, provides that "[elxcept as expressly
authorized by sections 407, 408, and 409, the compliance or
noncompliance with the provisions of this Act and any action taken
pursuant to this Act shall not be subject to judicial review." Here
judicial review is regulated and constrained to a set of specifically
authorized circumstances and legal grounds. For instance, if an
employee of Congress feels her statutory rights have been violated,
she must first go through counseling and mediation. If she is still not
satisfied, she may either file a complaint with a review board or file a
civil action in a United States district court. If she goes to the review
board and loses, she may only appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. While judicial review is certainly
being circumscribed, it is still available and thus laws that limit
jurisdiction over an area of law but do not eliminate it are not
counted in this study.
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The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Division C of Public Law 104-208, limits the remedies
courts are able to utilize in immigration proceedings. For example,
section 304 provides that "Any petition for review under section 242
of an order entered in absentia under this paragraph shall (except in
cases described in section 242(b)(5)) be confined to (i) the validity of
the notice provided to the alien, (ii) the reasons for the alien's not
attending the proceeding, and (iii) whether or not the alien is
removable." The legal grounds on which an alien can contest her
deportation are limited by the law, but her ability to obtain judicial
review is not utterly abolished.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
also limits remedies available in habeas corpus actions. According to
the conference report for the Act, the law "sets a one year limitation
on an application for a habeas writ and revises the procedures for
consideration of a writ in federal court. It provides for the exhaustion
of state remedies and requires deference to determinations of state
courts" (U.S. House Committee of Conference 1996, 111). The Act
also establishes other time limits within which the courts have
jurisdiction over hearing appeals concerning new evidence. While
prisoners have some access to the courts, this access is limited,
although not eliminated, by the Act. Provisions that only limit but do
not deny jurisdiction over a defined set of actions or rules are not
counted in this study.
After collecting the data, I tabulated the number of provisions
each Congress enacted that were express denials of jurisdiction.
Because more than one denial of jurisdiction could be contained in
one law, I also counted the number of laws within which these
provisions were enacted. The table displaying these results is
presented in the Findings.
This study focuses on cases in which Congress enacted laws that
deprived the courts of jurisdiction over a defined set of actions, rules
or cases between 1988 and 2004. Therefore, bills that were proposed
but not enacted are not reflected in the findings. Laws that were
enacted that regulate or partially limit the courts' jurisdiction have an
important influence on the powers of the judiciary, but could not be
counted under the definition of express denial of jurisdiction because
including them would have required developing criteria for
classifying the different degrees of restrictions on jurisdiction, a task
too ambitious for a study of this scope. Finally, to have a complete
picture of Congress's actions toward the judiciary's jurisdiction,
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cases in which Congress granted judicial review and expanded the
courts' jurisdiction should be considered. Future studies should
expand upon these findings by examining cases outside of this
study's scope.

Findings
I found that between 1988 and 2004, Congress enacted 166 express
denials of jurisdiction in 112 laws. The 104'~Congress (1995-1996)
had the most denials at 27, while the 103'~Congress (1993-1994) had
the fewest at seven. Since the second session of the 100" Congress
(1987-1988) alone had 19 denials, it is possible that the looth
Congress may have actually passed the most. Table 1 presents the
total number of denials enacted and the trends of denials over the
studied period.
As the table shows, there is no recognizable trend in the number
of denials enacted in each Congress. The 1 0 4 ~Congress
~
saw the
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, all laws
that significantly limited the jurisdiction of the courts. It is possible
that the Republican Party, which had attained majority control of
both houses of Congress in 1994, was finally implementing its
preferences in these policy areas. The 107'~Congress was the
Congress that dealt with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The 107'~Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act and other
legislation that included denials of jurisdiction to increase
government secrecy and empower the executive branch to deal with
reforms necessary to bolster homeland security.
Other than the significant peaks in the 101", 104'~and 1 0 7 ~ ~
Congresses, there is no pattern in the number of express denials of
jurisdiction. It is worth noting, however, that Congress regularly
enacts at least a half-dozen or more denials of jurisdiction in a twoyear period. While controversial and unpopular court decisions may
spark a wave of jurisdiction-stripping proposals, a stream of
jurisdictional denials constantly flows out of Congress without much
publicity or prominent debate.
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Table 1: Enacted Denials by Congress, 1988-2004

Congress
1Ooth
(1988 only)
10lSt
(1989-90)
102"~
(199 1-92)
103'~
(1993-94)
104'~
(1995-96)
105"
(1997-98)
106~~
(1999-00)
107~~
(200 1-02)
1Osth
(2003-04)
Total

Number
of
Express
Denials
19

Number
of Public
Laws
with
Denials
14

Total
Number
of Public
Laws
Enacted
470

166

112

4357

Percentage
of Public
Laws with
Denials
2.9%

2.5%

Most of the denials are narrow in scope. The majority of them
relate to a specific decision or set of decisions by an executive
branch official. Out of the 166 denials enacted in the studied period,
144, or 86.7%, shielded actions by executive branch officials. One
example is P.L. 101-649. A provision in the law shields decisions by
the Attorney General relating to granting or denying temporary
protected status to aliens. Presumably Congress included the denial
of judicial review because Congress did not want aliens whose
requests for temporary protected status were denied to be able to
delay their deportation by litigating the denial. Another example is
P.L. 102-579. Several provisions in the law prevent judicial review
of determinations regarding the safety of transporting and disposing
of radioactive transuranic waste materials. Since the disposal of
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radioactive materials is controversial and opposed by environmental
groups and the communities near the storage sites, Congress
probably wished to prevent litigation fiom delaying the disposal of
these dangerous materials.
Six denials, or 3.6% of the total number, bar judicial review of
decisions made by administration officials in order to comply with
international treaties. Certainly American foreign policy could be
complicated by lawsuits challenging actions that are necessary for
the United States to remain in compliance with its obligations to
foreign nations. P.L. 100-330 blocks judicial review of orders to
enforce a fisheries treaty between the United States and several
Pacific Oceans islands. P.L. 100-418, the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, contains provisions that deny the
courts jurisdiction over actions by the government to enforce antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Traditionally the executive
branch has been responsible for foreign relations and economic
policy, so perhaps this was the rationale for keeping the judiciary
from becoming involved in international trade disputes.
Twelve, or 7.2%, of the denials place decisions over informant
award programs outside of the judiciary's purview. The federal
government has many award programs to provide incentives to
informants and whistle-blowers. Awards are available for informing
on insider trading (P.L. 100-704), defrauding the government (P.L.
101-123), falsifying drug statements (P.L. 102-282), making
fraudulent telemarketing calls (P.L. 103-322), and conspiring to
commit terrorist acts or traffic narcotics (P.L. 105-323). These
jurisdictional exemptions seem to be justified on the basis of secrecy
and efficiency. Gathering information from informants on any of a
broad range of crimes requires secrecy to protect the integrity of the
investigation and the security of the informants themselves. It would
be difficult to protect informants and administer the awards program
effectively if an informant could sue because she is displeased with
the amount of her award.
Many actions relating to employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency are immune to judicial review. Denials of jurisdiction over
CIA personnel decisions were enacted three times in the studied
period. P.L. 102-496 denied jurisdiction to review decisions relating
to the CIA'S retirement and disability system. P.L. 105-272
prevented courts from reviewing actions of the CIA Director and the
CIA Inspector General relating to complaints from CIA employees.
Finally, decisions relating to the compensation, insurance and taxes
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of undercover intelligence agents were shielded from judicial review
by P.L. 108-487. Since it is difficult to maintain secrecy in civilian
courts, it is likely that the CIA requested and Congress granted
protection from judicial review over some of the ways the CIA deals
with its agents and employees.
Five, or 3.0%, of the denials of jurisdiction were used to settle
disagreements over timber sale on federal land. Perhaps
environmentalist advocacy groups were litigating or threatening to
impede selling timber or building roads in national parks, so
Congress made the decisions relating to selling timber or building
roads in those parks unreviewable. For example, P.L. 100-446
finalized the Forest Service's plan to sell timber and build roads in
the Silver Complex Fire Recovery Area of the Siskiyou National
Forest and sell timber from the Mapleton Ranger District of the
Siuslaw National Forest. Forest Service guidelines for selling timber
in Washington and Oregon were at the center of a court dispute. In
P.L. 101-121, Congress denied the courts jurisdiction to review any
sales permitted by an agreement between the government and the
plaintiffs.
Between 1988 and 2004, Congress enacted two denials covering
federal laws and two denials related to administrative regulations. So
the vast majority of denials of jurisdiction do not prevent review of
legislation or regulations, the type of denial most frequently
mentioned in the media. Rather, most of the denials are narrowly
tailored to protect specific executive actions and decisions. Instead of
passing the Marriage Protection Act to shield an entire section of the
United States Code from review, Congress is enacting denials of
jurisdiction like one contained in P.L. 108-7 that prevents courts
from reviewing the distribution of payments to tobacco farmers.

Discussion
Because most unreviewable actions are undertaken in the executive
branch, congressional denials of jurisdiction relate as much to the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive as they
relate to the separation between the judiciary and legislature.
Determinations on the legality of many decisions are being made
between members of Congress and administration officials, who then
exclude the judiciary from participating. Since many of the decisions
over which judicial review is prohibited are narrow in scope, related
to national security (an area the judiciary tends to tread lightly in any
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case), or merely part of the implementation of a larger project that is
judicially reviewable, the distortion this phenomenon has on the
relationship between the three branches is probably slight.
It must be emphasized that if this study had undertaken the task
of counting every grant of jurisdiction, the number of grants would
far outweigh the number of denials. Denying jurisdiction, while more
common than may be generally perceived, is still the exception to the
rule of granting judicial review. However, the available data do not
allow us to be certain that the practice has not become more common
over time. While the number of jurisdictional denials over the last 16
years has been related to shifts of political power and catastrophic
events, it is possible that the legislature and executive may be
tending more often to exclude the judiciary from the decisionmaking process. If this practice becomes more prevalent, it will
constitute a major shift of power from the judicial branch to the
legislative and executive branches that draft and implement the laws.
Another aspect of the current practice of limiting the jurisdiction
of the courts that may raise concern is the low level of public
attention paid to it. While bills with sweeping and controversial
denials of jurisdiction are heavily covered and debated in the news
media, smaller denials of executive decisions are largely ignored.
Ironically, the very characteristics of the proposals that are heavily
discussed are also those that make it extremely unlikely that the bill
will pass. The provisions that are likely to be enacted, however, are
innocuously inserted into legislation and enacted without fanfare.
This lack of attention is due to several factors. First, the bills that
contain these denials are not identified as bills to reduce the
jurisdiction of the courts. Rather, they are presented as proposals to
reform Medicare, to k n d the Department of the Interior, or to
implement an international treaty. The denial of jurisdiction is a
minor detail, one sentence that surely is knowingly inserted but not
carefully examined. Second, the areas over which jurisdiction is
denied are generally narrow and obscure, hardly interesting material
for a newspaper story or television broadcast. Third, since the set of
people whose potential lawsuits are barred by the provision is
relatively small (again because the scope of the denial is narrow),
there are few people to complain when their ability to be heard in
court is threatened.
The lack of publicity over this aspect of the relationship between
the branches of government also carries the risk that American
citizens, happily presuming that their interests, if necessary, can be
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vindicated in court, are actually having their right to be heard in
court quietly taken away from them. Provisions of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and USA
PATRIOT Act restrict judicial review over important individual
rights (habeas corpus review and national security letters,
respectively) but do not entirely eliminate it and thus were not
counted in this study. Nonetheless, if the practice of denying the
courts jurisdiction outright becomes more commonplace, important
rights over which judicial review is currently circumscribed may be
barred from the courthouse.
Certainly the executive and legislative branches are politically
accountable, but the voters cannot vote for or against a candidate on
the basis of information they do not possess. To mention a parallel
case, no legislator need fear severe electoral repercussions for his
vote on the intelligence budget, because the budget is classified.
Likewise, provisions that are unclassified but so obscure as to be
virtually unknown to the electorate do not have consequences at the
ballot box. Many of the jurisdictional denials are buried in large and
complex pieces of legislation. This makes it difficult for citizens, the
press, or even most legislators to notice the denials and voice any
concerns.
If this is the case, which branch is most likely to make wise
policy decisions and protect individual rights? It is difficult to say.
On the one hand, Congress and the administration possess
information and experience that is unavailable to the courts. On the
other hand, the executive's and legislature's enmeshment in the
political process and the influences of interest groups that affect it
may mean that some groups are unjustly harmed by decisions that
are also rendered immune to judicial review. As one scholar wrote
about the Founders' view of the courts, "the supporters of the
Constitution believed that the most dangerous branch, the one with
the greatest capacity to annoy or injure rights, would be the
legislature, because, through it, a majority actuated by a sense of
injustice could effect its designs" (Kozlowski 2003, 85-86, emphasis
in original). The courts are supposed to protect rights and invalidate
actions that violate legal rights. It may be true that the decisions
Congress has protected from judicial review would have passed
muster and the denial of jurisdiction merely made the administration
of public policy more efficient. However, there is no way of knowing
this because any level of judicial review has been foreclosed by the
jurisdictional denial.
Congressional denial of the courts'
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jurisdiction and the public's low level of awareness of the practice
raise issues relating to the transparency of executive decision-making
and individual rights.

Conclusion
This study has revealed what is a largely unexamined practice in
congressional and executive policy-making: shielding executive
determinations from judicial review. Regardless of whether Congress
is appropriately exercising its constitutional authority, history
demonstrates that Congress has proposed and passed legislation
denying jurisdiction over certain cases and decisions. Again, it must
be acknowledged that Congress grants judicial review far more often
than it denies it. But it must also be recognized that the practice in
which Congress and the executive branch are engaged raises
concerns for the future of the constitutional separation of powers,
open governance and protection of individual rights.
Further studies should be conducted to determine more
accurately the nature of the denials of jurisdiction, the public
perception (or lack thereof) of this governmental behavior, how the
judiciary has responded to these denials, and the historical trends
prior to 1988. This information will help us better assess the wisdom
and propriety of Congress' use of its power to make exceptions to
and regulations of the judiciary's jurisdiction.
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Appendix to Benjamin Keele, "Ganging Up Against the Courte: Congressional Curtailment of
Judicial Review, 1988-2004
Express Congressional Denials of Judicial Review Between the 100thand 108thCongress

Statutorv Provision

Law or Action not Reviewable

P.L. 100-274,102 Stat. 48,§3

Determination by Secretary to acquire materials
and services for the production of coinage from
foreign sources.

P.L. 100-330,102 Stat. 591, $11

Orders by the Secretary enforcing
the Treaty on Fisheries Between the
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and
the Government of the United States of America

P.L. 100-418,102 Stat. 1107, $1316

Determinations by the administering authority
that a country does not operate under a market
economy

Ibid, $1320

Determinations by the administering authority
relating to monitoring in trade a downstream
product

Ibid, $1321

Decisions by the administering authority relating
to categorizing merchandise proposed for
inclusion in antidumping and countervailing
duties orders

Ibid, $5021

Provisions of 50 USCS Appx §2170(d), which
prescribe the determinations the President must
make before suspending or prohibiting an
acquisition, merger or takeover of a person
engaged in interstate commerce that threaten
national security

P.L. 100-427, 102 Stat. 1603, $25

Decisions by the Secretary not to
permit tribal governments' use of Bureau of
Indian Affairs facilities

P.L. 100-435,102 Stat. 1645, $603

Determinations by the Secretary concerning
whether a State agency had good cause for its
failure to meet error tolerance levels

P.L. 100-446,102 Stat. 1774, $320

Final Environmental Impact Statement, Record
of Decision, and Forest Service decisions relating
to timber sales and road construction in the Silver
Complex Fire Recovery Area of the Siskiyou
National Forest.

Ibid, $321

Decisions by Secretary to sell timber from the
Mapleton Ranger District of the Siuslaw National
Forest.

P.L. 100-449,102 Stat. 1851, $401

Decisions by administering authority or United
States Customs Service to suspend liquidation of
entries of merchandise.

Ibid, $403

Decisions regarding the disclosure or
nondisclosure of material under protective order.

P.L. 100-499,102 Stat. 2491,$6

The RARE I1 Final Environmental
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the
National Forest System in Oklahoma.

P.L. 100-532,102 Stat. 2654, $102

Content of list of registered pesticides and
guidelines for formatting studies and identifying
information that may not meet regulatory
requirements.

P.L. 100-547,102 Stat. 2736,8202

The RARE I1 Final Environmental
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the
National Forest System in Alabama.

P.L. 100-653,102 Stat. 3825, $703

Valuations of in-kind contributions and personal
property from California to pay for cost of study
of fishery resources in the Russian River basin.

P.L. 100-678,102 Stat. 4049, $6

Determinations that noncompliance with building
codes or zoning laws is necessary for national
security.

P.L. 100-690,102 Stat. 4181, $7522

Decisions to retain or transfer to other agencies
materials that are subject to civil forfeiture.

P.L. 100-704,102 Stat. 4677,$3

Determinations to award bounties to informants.

P.L. 101-73,103 Stat. 183, $212

Determinations to deny claims or portions of
claims; claims for payment from any institution

over which the Corporation is receiver or for
actions or omissions of the Corporation as
receiver.
Ibid, 8301

Determinations not to disclose information in
reports of savings associations.

Ibid, $1118

Decisions of Appraisal Subcommittee on
recognizing state appraiser certifying and
licensing agencies.

Ibid, $1217

Decisions by the liquidating agent to disallow
claims; claims for payment from any institution
over which the liquidating agent is receiver or for
actions or omissions of the liquidating agent as
receiver.

P.L. 101-121,103 Stat. 701,§318

Forest Service Guidelines concerning timber sales
in Washington and Oregon; timber sales
permitted by agreement between the Forest
Service and plaintiffs.

P.L. 101-123,103 Stat. 759, $2

Failure of the Attorney General to make
payments to whistleblowers.

P.L. 101-189,103 Stat. 1352, $1301

Denials of review by Court of Military Appeals
not subject to certiorari review by Supreme
Court.

P.L. 101-195,103 Stat. 1784, $5

The RARE I1 Final Environmental
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the
National Forest System in Nevada.

P.L. 101-222,103 Stat. 1892, $6

Designations of items as defense articles or
defense services.

P.L. 101-239,103 Stat. 2106, $6003

Decisions of the Secretary on changing the
geographic classification of hospitals.

Ibid, $6102

Determinations of historical payment bases,
relative values and relative value units,
conversion factors; establishment of geographic
adjustment factors and a system for the coding of
physicians' services.

P.L. 101-401,104 Stat. 863, $5

The RARE I1 Final Environmental
Statement of January 1979 with respect t o the
National Forest System in Maine.

P.L. 101-452,104 Stat. 1054, $5

Valuations of in-kind contributions and personal
property from Washington to pay for cost of
study of fishery resources in the Chehalis River
Basin.

P.L. 101-508,104 Stat. 1388, $10301

Estimates of number of expected aliens and
amount of the United States Travel and Tourism
Facilitation Fee for a given calendar year.

P.L. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399,5228

Determinations to assess a civil penalty exceeding
$200,000.

Ibid, $301

Determinations of priorities for the promulgation
of emission standards; reports of the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.

Ibid, VOl

Corrections or failures to correct data affecting
Phase I1 units' baselines and actual 1985
emissions rates.

Ibid, $701

Determinations to assess civil penalties greater
than $200,000 or assessing civil penalties on
violations that occurred more than 12 months
ago.

P.L. 101-552,104 Stat. 2736, $4

Agency decisions to use or not use arbitration
procedures; decisions to terminate arbitration
proceedings or vacate an arbitral award.

P.L. 101-592,104 Stat. 2943,§9

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions.

P.L. 101-601,104 Stat. 3048, $9

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions.

P.L. 101-625,104 Stat. 4079, $108

Explanations in jurisdictions' reports regarding
the effect of public policies on affordable housing.

P.L. 101-647,104 Stat. 4789, 52587

Decisions by the Attorney General to award or
not award payments to informants of financial
institution offenses.

P.L. 101-648,104 Stat. 4969,§3

Agency actions establishing, assisting or
terminating negotiated rulemaking committees.

P.L. 101-649,104 Stat. 4978,5302

Determinations of Attorney General relating to
temporary protected status of aliens.

P.L. 102-29 105 Stat. 169, $3

Determinations and reports by Special Board
mediating railroad labor disputes.

P.L. 102-240,105 Stat. 1914, 52502

Notice of delayed action extension of comment
period or completion period on proposed
rulemaking regarding motor vehicle safety.

P.L. 102-282,106 Stat. 149,§3

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions; informant awards.

P.L. 102-306,106 Stat. 260,54

Decisions of arbiter in mediating railroad labor
disputes.

P.L. 102-325,106 Stat. 448,51317

Regulations relating to higher education tribal
grants.

P.L. 102-344,106 Stat. 921, 52

Determinations by the Director of the Census
triggering a bilingual voting materials
requirement.

P.L. 102-496,106 Stat. 3180, $802

Determinations by the Director of Central
Intelligence relating to the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System.

P.L. 102-567,106 Stat. 4270, $811

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions.

P.L. 102-579,106 Stat. 4777, $6

Determinations and certifications by various
officials preceding the commencement of test
phase for disposing of transuranic waste.

Ibid, $7

Survey required before commencement of disposal
of transuranic waste.

Ibid, $8

Determinations by Administrators regarding
facility's compliance with final disposal
regulations.

Ibid, $16

Determinations by Nuclear Regulatory
Commission that packages for transporting
transuranic waste meets quality assurance
requirements.

P.L. 102-587,106 Stat. 5039, $8011

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions.

P.L. 103-66,107 Stat. 312, $6003

Changes in Federal Communications Commission
regulatory fees.

P.L. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796, $60009

Determinations by Attorney General that foreign
murder of a United States national took place in

country in which the person is no longer present
and the country lacks the ability to lawfully
secure the person's return.
Ibid, $250004

Decisions of Attorney General relating to awards
to informants.

P.L. 103-354,108 Stat. 3178, $304

$304, which establishes the Office of Risk
Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.

P.L. 103-407,108 Stat. 4210, $8

Final civil penalties not subject to review in
recovery actions.

P.L. 103-438,108 Stat. 4597, $9

Determinations regarding foreign cooperation in
antitrust investigations.

P.L. 103-465,108 Stat. 4809, $801

Award by the Federal Communications
Commission of preferences and awards released
February 3,1994.

P.L. 104-13,109 Stat. 163, $2

Determinations by Director to approve or not act
upon a collection of information contained in an
agency rule.

P.L. 104-99,110 Stat. 26, $407

Actions by Secretary relating to foreclosure
avoidance.

P.L. 104-121,110 Stat. 847,9212

Small entity compliance guides.

Ibid, $251

Congressional review and disapproval of
administrative rules.

P.L. 104-130,110 Stat. 1200, $2

Congressional identification of limited tax
benefits.

P.L. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214, $401

Continued detention of aliens except when
constitutional claims invoked.

Ibid, $440

Deportation orders of aliens who have committed
certain offenses.

Ibid, $815

Decisions of Attorney General relating to awards
to informants.

P.L. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321, Title I1

Determination by Forest Service to permit sale of
timber from Alaska.

P.L. 104-164,110 Stat. 1421, $157

Presidential determinations to impose sanctions
on those contributing to nuclear proliferation.

P.L. 104-170,110 Stat. 1489,9210

Failure of the Administrator to complete reviews
of pesticides for minor uses within 12 months.

Ibid, $405

List of priorities for the review of tolerations and
exemptions for chemical pesticide residues.

P.L. 104-182,110 Stat. 1613,5102

Decisions to include unregulated drinking water
contaminants on a list of contaminants that may
require regulation.

P.L. 104-201,110 Stat. 2422, $657

Determinations relating to payments made to
certain prisoners of war in the Vietnam War.

P.L. 104-204,110 Stat. 2874, $427

Decisions to cancel delegations of authority to
insure certain mortgages.

P.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. A, $110 Decision by Attorney General to terminate the
Department of Justice Telecommunications
Carrier Compliance Fund.
Ibid, Div. A, $664

The Electronic Benefit Transfer Pilot project.

Ibid, Div. A, $2504

40 CFR 300.1105 as issued April 29,1992.

Ibid, Div. A, $5203

Decision by Authority to issue orders, rules or
regulations.

Ibid, Div. C, $303

Decisions of the Attorney General regarding the
detention and release of illegal aliens.

Ibid, Div. C, $304

Decisions to deny orders of voluntary departure.

Ibid, Div. C, $306

Various matters and forms of review relating to
removal of illegal aliens.

Ibid, Div. C, 9343

Determinations relating t o the admission of
foreign health-care workers.

Ibid, Div. C, $604

Determinations relating to an alien's eligibility to
apply for asylum.

P.L. 104-227,110 Stat. 3034, $104

Determinations and actions relating to
environmental impact assessment of Antarctic
joint activities.

P.L. 104-237,110 Stat. 3099, $401

Extension of application of law to sale to certain
pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolarnine drug
products for six months.

P.L. 104-333,110 Stat. 4093, $304

Exchange of land in Utah.

P.L. 105-33,111 Stat. 251, 54421

Classifications and payment rates for inpatient
rehabilitation services.

Ibid, $4454

Estimates of expenditures and reductions of
expenditures for coverage of religious nonmedical
health care institutional services.

Ibid, $4523

Classifications and payment rates for a
prospective payment system for hospital
outpatient department services.

Ibid, $4531

Fee schedule for ambulance services.

Ibid, 54603

Payments and adjustments for a prospective
payment system for home health services.

P.L. 105-65,111 Stat. 1344, $516

Determinations not to not consider restructure
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